Crooked Lessons from the Indian Wars by Simons, Anna
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2013
Crooked Lessons from the Indian Wars
Simons, Anna
Simons, Anna, Crooked Lessons from the Indian Wars, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 36: 685-697, 2013.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38347
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Studies in Co11jlic1 & Terrorism, 36:685-697, 2013 
Copyright ©Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 
ISSN: 1057-610X print/ 1521-0731 online 
DOI : I0.1080/I057610X.2013.802977 
Review Article 
Crooked Lessons from the Indian Wars 
ANNA SIMONS 
Department of Defense Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA, USA 
One aim of this article is to chide tl1e U.S. military-and Americans overall-for 1101 
paying sufficient atte/1/ion to our historic relations with American Indians. After all, 
American Indians are the non-Westerners we Americans should know best. A review 
of American Indian history can shed importa111 light on our current enco1111ters with 
tribal peoples elsewhere. At the same time, however, great care needs to be taken. 
/11stead of just citing similarities-as analogies lead us to do-we must also take 11ote 
of differences, which we ca11 best do by using history as a/oil. 
Most wars invite analogies. Future historians will likely have a field day with the U.S.'s 
recent incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of the analogies that pundits and others 
used between 2001 and 2011 are bound to strike them as little more than bad history. 
Others might be provocative, although not always in the ways intended. For instance, take 
the analogy that is the premise for this article.1 A number of years ago Robert Kaplan 
wrote, "the American military is back to the days of fighting the Indians."2 Tellingly, he 
was not the only one to invoke Indians. The "imperial grunts," or soldiers and Marines he 
spent time with, also referred to Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as Colombia, Mongolia, and 
Yemen) as Injun Country-a term also used during the Vietnam era.3 
As for why, out of all the irregular warfare comparisons made, this one deserves partic-
ular attention, just consider: not only are Indians the non-Westerners we Americans-and 
members of the U.S. military-should know best, which means our shared history could 
(or should) have something to offer when dealing with tribal peoples elsewhere. But also, 
if only we had re-considered our relations with Indians we would have at least drawn on 
our own history and would have been able to compare our current selves to our past selves 
instead of to ancient Roman, British, or French imperialists. 
One caveat: the argument made in this review article is not that American Indians 
offer the best lens through which to consider why Islamists, or certain Afghans or Iraqis, 
chose to fight us as they did. Rather, it is to suggest that a re-appraisal of our relations 
with Indians may help us better appreciate what we still do not sufficiently understand 
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about tribal peoples. A second caveat is that to understand the source code for any conflict 
requires digging deep into the local context. We should want to look at changes over time, 
critical events, and local interpretations of history. We should also want to focus on who 
has inhabited the neighborhood, for how long, and how everyone has, or has not, gotten 
along. However, one problem with being too contextualized is that teasing apart the local 
from the global can be difficult. At the same time, taking too global or macro a view can 
cause its own distortions. For instance: Al Qaeda. Are we better off regarding Al Qaeda as 
an "it" or a "them"? Al Qaeda declared war against the United States. Did that then render 
members of Al Qaeda terrorists or insurgents? What about the Taliban-are its members 
terrorists or insurgents? Or are most Taliban just accidental guerrillas? 
The U.S. military entered a terminological hell quite some time ago. Just look at all the 
ink spilled trying to distinguish among 4th Generation warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric 
warfare, irregular warfare, and so on. Small wonder disagreements persist among 
government agencies, across military services, and between commanders over how to 
operationalize whatever it is these terms refer to. Ironically, the tried-and-true cross-cultural 
(or anthropological) approach to both Afghanistan and Iraq would have been to figure 
out what terms our opponents were using for the fight they picked with us and then adopt 
some variant of those. This is what the Israelis did in the wake of the first intifada, which 
they could not treat as if they or anyone else had seen something similar before, because 
they had not. The international community likewise had no problem referring to Afghans 
who fought the Soviets in the 1980s as 11111jalzadi11, a term that signaled that more was at 
stake than just nationalism or communism; religion had been injected into the mix, too. 
Yet another source of confusion future historians will have to sort through is the ways in 
which we have characterized our adversaries' motivations. For instance, several years ago 
Al Qaeda terrorists were referred to as Islamo-Fascists. Yet, some of the same people who 
used that term also insisted that Osama bin Laden and his associates were promulgating a 
radical ideology, not anything religious. In fact, according to Daniel Pipes, "militant Islam 
resembles fascism and communism more than any religious movement."4 Even General 
John Abizaid seemed to believe we were "fighting an ideological vanguard similar to the 
Bolsheviks."5 Yet, during fascism's heyday in the 1930s there were Italian fascists, Spanish 
fascists, Rumanian fascists, Nazi fascists, but there was no pan-fascist movement devoted to 
creating a fascist uber-wnma. In fact, as the Nazis themselves strove to prove, the goal was 
just the opposite: the Nazis sought a hierarchy with themselves at the top, while communists 
stood for a nation-dissolving ideology that, as an ideology, eschewed any hint of Divine 
Judgment or the Afterlife. This cannot possibly describe Islamists' goals, and especially 
not when the supra-community of believers is meant to include Arabs, Somalis, Malays, 
and anyone, actually, willing to submit to an omniscient, omnipotent Allah. 
Indians-Foils, Not Analogs 
One easy explanation for why we remain so confused about our Islamist adversaries' 
motivations is because no one can politically afford to agree with them that they have 
embroiled us in a cosmic struggle. A second reason has to do with the nature of our 
response, which has been military, and our military's orientation-which is technophile. 
Nor does the "tech" prefix refer solely to technology. Our military also heavily invests 
in techniques. Call something an "insurgency" and you should then be able to apply 
counterinsurgency techniques. As for a third explanation: we have never been very good 
at understanding non-Western values. Non-Westerners' exploitable fissures and political 
structure, sometimes. But their priorities, rarely. 
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Here is where our all-too-American history of never understanding American Indians 
should shed important light. 
For starters, many American Indian tribes continue to be riven by old splits between 
traditionalists and accommodationists. Put most simply, accommodationists are individuals 
for whom traditional tribal practices evoke nostalgia, but no special reverence. In contrast, 
traditionalists try to follow age-old prescriptions for how tribespeople should conduct 
themselves. As far as traditionalists are concerned, traditions are not just a matter for 
occasional ceremony, they are the stuff of life. 
Just on the face of it, the fact that such divides persist in many Indian communities 
suggests that after hundreds of years during which the U.S. government, missionaries, 
and others have introduced program after program to try to get Indians to assimilate, 
there must be something about Westernization that still cannot be squared with Indian 
values. Or, perhaps a better way to put this is that for those Indians who want to stay 
Lakota, Apsaalooke, or Hopi, the only way to stay distinctively themselves is ... to stay 
distinctively themselves. In other words, when one's paramount duty is to past and future 
generations, certain practices should never be shed. If this makes tribalism sound like a 
tautology, that is exactly what it is; its circularity is what helps keep people(s) distinct. 
Say, for a moment, you belong to Tribe X. And say you are committed to Tribe X's sur-
vival. If that is the case, then you should do everything in your power to ensure Tribe X stays 
intact, while if someone were to ask you what most matters to you as a member of Tribe X, 
your answer would likely be: "the integrity of my tribe." If you were then asked "what ac-
counts for the integrity of the tribe?" the answer would be: "that it matters to its members." 
Worth noting is that tribalism is implicitly chauvinist. But-and here is one profound differ-
ence between tribalists and us (who are Western individualists)-tribes do not proselytize. 
Also, continuity is critical. In fact, the very persistence of tribes suggests that the same 
ideas of sovereignty, autonomy, and distinctiveness that inspired members to fight the U.S. 
government way back when must still inspire people.6 Or, as one of Techumseh's biogra-
phers wrote, the "constant, crucial ambition of Shawnee was to remain Shawnee, which 
they were unshakably convinced was much better than being anyone else." This meant that 
for Techumseh and his followers, it was better to fight for being able to die as a Shawnee 
than surrender and become something else.7 
Again, from a tribalist perspective, tribes not only had (and have) a corporate (and 
sovereign) right to exist, but their members bear a responsibility-a duty even-to value 
collective over self.8 This explains a lot. Even when individual warriors were motivated to 
attain glory or prove their manliness, so long as these were also tribal values, individuals 
could prove their collective worth whenever they went to war; they did not need to be 
(re)socialized for selfless service, as the Army needs to do today.9 The flip side of collec-
tivism is that leaders sometimes found themselves having to wage war despite themselves. 
For instance, Mow-way, leader of a Comanche band, continued to wage war even when he 
knew the effort was doomed. Until his followers were ready to give up, he did not feel he 
could. 1° Captain Jack of the Modoc likewise went against his own better judgment during 
the Modoc War, which he led. 11 Or, as was the case in the 2nd Seminole War: "For the 
Indians who had decided to stay and fight, maintaining solidarity was of extreme impor-
tance. To go against the expressed wishes of the entire tribe was considered treason."12 
The Fight Against Westernization 
Contrast this with what underpins our solidarity as a nation of American individualists. For 
us, the individual is the unit of account. Everything we (non-Indian) Americans most value 
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flows from, or is built around, the sanctity of the individual. From the Bill of Rights and 
the Constitution to our legal system we are protected by law as individuals. Of course, more 
than just our rule of law rests on the primacy of the individual. Democracy, capitalism, the 
notion of universal human rights, even our convictions about evolution-all are predicated 
on the significance we accord the individual. In fact, few of the things we consider integral 
to the development of the West-not exploration, nor science, nor the quest for personal 
progress-would have been likely had individuals not been encouraged to compete against 
one another as individuals. 
Now, compare this to how ambition is channeled in societies where reputations are 
secured by giving things away. In most tribal societies, conspicuously acquiring, keeping, 
and displaying anything-beyond (maybe) food and attire for a transitory feast-is frowned 
upon, and an individual's well-being should never come at the expense of the spiritual 
well-being of his or her larger kin group. 
' Another source of contrast is that we are addicted to constant improvement or, at the 
very least, change. 13 They aim for social harmony at almost all costs. These represent 
antithetical goals. Consequently, our insistence on progress is bound to engender resistance 
from at least some in all tribal societies. 
As the last several hundred years attest, Westernization-our penetration of other 
people's world(s)-represents the most consistently aggressive transformative force in 
human history. Yet, no matter how consistently aggressive Westernization is, it is only 
fitfully violent. This paradox lies at the heart of the West's success. It means the threshold 
for people recognizing that they have changed (or are being changed) from what they were 
into something else is hard for them to often detect. 
Without question, too, Westernization's effects have differed different places. Nonethe-
less, the same overall dynamic applies. People are much more likely to absorb new practices 
and ideas piecemeal, at their own pace, so long as they can do so without feeling themselves 
fundamentally changing, or changing against their will. This means entire societies almost 
never acculturate overnight. Instead, usually some coercive authority from without or from 
on high, or alternatively some faction from within, has to apply pressure. But then, as soon 
as force is felt, as soon as some portion of the community begins to turn, this poses a threat 
to the corporate "whole," and traditionalists-those committed to preserving the integrity 
of the group-react. They either reach out and rally their followers or their followers call 
on them to help the group resist. 
In an effort to restore what was, leaders bent on tribal revitalization will usually strive 
to return to first principles. They shed polluting foreign practices. Yet, at the same time, 
some degree of syncretism creeps in. This means that people bent on not changing will 
wind up changing some things in order to not have to change what they regard as most 
sacred or essential to their identity. In other words, traditionalists never give up everything, 
just anything that (in their view) jeopardizes the moral order. 
This is why distinguishing between modernization and Westernization is so important. 
People everywhere adopt new technologies-even from their enemies. As people adapt to 
changes in the broader environment they cannot help but modernize. It is not the least bit 
hypocritical, then, for groups like Al Qaeda to recruit supporters via the internet. Rarely 
has technology upset those who decry Westernization. Or to return to the American Indian 
example, Indians did not reject firearms any more than they rejected steel-edged tools or 
cast iron cooking pots. Instead, they objected to missionary and government efforts to 
change social relations. From a tribal point of view, changing gender relations posed grave 
cosmological dangers, which is one reason Quaker efforts to "alter the sexual division of 
labor" helped precipitate the Creek Civil War, which in turn helped trigger the 1st Seminole 
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War-with ripple effects up and down the Eastern seaboard and as far afield as Oklahoma 
and Texas. 14 
One commonality across all tribes was (and is) the extent to which respect for the past 
matters: 
A group's sacred history (oral traditions, stories of origin, creation, and trick-
sters, etc.) linked the other aspects of peoplehood together. The sacred history 
told about a group's territory and how the group got there, was a "how-to" in 
regard to religion, defined the group's kinship structure, and was the resource 
for sociopolitical organization. 15 
If it sounds like belonging to a peoplehood entails commitment to a "way of life," it does. 
As Elsie Clews Parsons put it when describing the Pueblos and Hopi (circa the I 920s), 
"economic life is so integrated with religion that anything hurtful to the economy tends 
also to be hurtful to religion"-a description that could actually be applied to any group of 
people who strives to abide by its faith. 16 Thus, even though Islam is always described as 
"a way of life" and not just a religion, the same actually holds true for remaining resolutely 
Dine or Seneca (or Amish, Hutterite, Hasidic, or Baptist). 
To be fair, Westerners did not initially pose a clear and present existential threat to tribal 
integrity or to Indian practices. 17 For decades, White traders and trappers and Indians lived 
more or less symbiotically. It was not until emigrants began acquiring, owning, and buying 
and selling land that differences hardened. From the Indian perspective, the treatment of 
land as a commodity was both alien and alienating. Worse, it was Whites encroaching on 
Indian land, and White Indian agents, missionaries, and do-gooders who sought to change 
Indians-never the reverse. So, where was the middle ground? 
By the 1860s: 
... the underlying assumption of the architects of ... treaties was that within 
thirty years with the help of education, the powerful motivation of private 
property, which would encourage greed (which was held to be inconspicuous 
in Indian societies), and the inculcation of Christian values by missionaries, the 
Indians would be sufficiently acculturated to enter the mainstream of American 
society. 18 
It should not take much to fast forward from policies like that to our present-day attitudes 
toward the "developing world." We Americans have long been solipsists, committed to the 
notion that if only we affect the right kind of liberation, we can help others become more 
like us. 19 Yet, scan Indian country. The fact that plenty of American Indians continue to 
remain adamantly Indian suggests that, when push comes to shove, at least some members 
of tribes most places are likely to want to stand their ground.20 
"How!" 
American Indian history offers all sorts of apposite lessons. Another that should resonate 
today is just how adept the most famous Indian fighters were at cultivating the media. 
Take General George S. Crook, whom many rate as America's preeminent Indian fighter. 
According to one of his biographers, Crook recognized early on "that advancement in 
the army depended on actions for which an officer received credit rather than an actual 
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achievement."21 Thus, something else Crook availed himself of was John Gregory Bourke, 
a gifted memoirist and ethnographer. 
But Crook does not just deserve our attention because he sought attention. He really was 
successful. He bested Indians in three different regions-the Northwest, Southwest, and 
the northern Plains-altering tactics to suit each tribe, yet always taking the same overall 
approach. According to Crook, his method was simple: to always be fair. 22 According to 
Bourke, Crook had no "policy" toward the management of Indians "in which respect he 
differed from every other man I have met."23 Instead, he applied principles. Or, as historian 
Charles Robinson writes, "whatever Crook's faults, they were offset by his fundamental 
humanity. None could deny the faith he inspired among the Indians. In war, he could be as 
cruel as they, but he always respected them as human beings."24 
Much the same has been said of Kit Carson. Although Kit Carson's career was about 
as different from Crook's as it is possible to imagine-Carson started off as a mountain 
man and then served as an Indian agent before ever accepting a military command-their 
attitudes were strikingly similar: "He [Carson] was acquainted with their customs and their 
ways of thinking, and these he respected. He would listen to them with attention, and would 
respond in ways they could understand, and he told them the truth as he saw it."25 Also, 
"Carson believed, as did many whites of the time, that a military defeat severe enough to 
convince Indians of the futility of resistance was a necessary precondition of lasting peace, 
at least in some cases. People with warrior traditions might not give up their way of life 
unless they were genuinely convinced of the necessity."26 
One other thing Crook and Carson shared was their attention to the literal, and not 
just human, terrain-Carson thanks to years of travel, and Crook because he insisted on 
traversing an area before deploying his forces. Not only did both men thus appreciate who 
and what they were up against, but when operating in the Southwest both did their utmost 
to wear out their quarry. Their aim: to keep Indians on the run. Crook's strategy in Arizona 
was to encircle and relentlessly pummel any Indians his units came across. He would then 
have mobile units continue to crisscross the area until all resistance was smashed.27 At one 
point he mounted nine expeditions simultaneously. 
Yet, as impressive as this sounds, it was hardly unique. It turns out that Anthony Wayne, 
who took command of the Legion of the United States in 1792 on the heels of two disastrous 
defeats by the Shawnee, studied the Shawnees's strengths and weaknesses, and once he 
discovered that they were neither sufficiently well organized nor well enough provisioned 
to conduct a Jong campaign, embarked on a war of non-stop attrition.28 To contend with the 
Seminoles in the late 1830s, Zachary Taylor divided his area of operations into squares, and 
built roads in order to force the Seminoles further and further south into uninhabited areas. 
Walker Annistead (who succeeded Taylor) then ratcheted up the pressure by pursuing the 
Seminoles throughout the summer, denying them any possibility of respite.29 
One thing to note is that in each of these campaigns, although successful commanders 
analyzed their predecessors' failures and thereby seem to have been innovators in their own 
right, none operated in a vacuum. As Crook's own career suggests, plenty of institutional 
knowledge was available. Not only did Crook himself serve in three different regions, but 
in each location he would have served with (and was served by) others who had prior 
experience fighting Indians-to include other Indians.30 
Techniques-Auxiliaries and Scouts 
Most successful campaigns waged against Indians fit a common pattern, which went 
something like this: strike; chase whoever got away; prevent the enemy from refitting and 
recovering; locate their hideouts; strike again-all while offering the prospect of surrender. 
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Variations on this theme were legion. The most successful Indian fighters targeted 
Indians during whatever season made it most difficult for Indians to recover: winter on the 
northern plains, summer on the southern plains. Or successful Indian fighters sent forces to 
penetrate Indians' safest redoubts. Sometimes they adopted both strategies together. This 
is what finally worked against the Navajo-whose flocks were seized, crops destroyed, and 
sanctuary penetrated in a single sweep. In other words, attrition alone proved insufficient. 
Instead, to get Indians to surrender required visibly destroying their means of collective 
self-reliance. 
Crook, for example, understood that one difference between Apaches, who had "so 
few artificial wants," and Plains tribes boiled down to property.31 Ergo, he went out of 
his way to burn Plains Indian villages in winter when, if tribes lost their teepees they lost 
everything.32 But not everyone relished the idea of such pitiless destruction. According to 
Thomas Dunlay, Kit Carson did everything possible to avoid the sweep he was ordered to 
make through Canyon de Chelly, the Navajo's most impregnable safe haven.33 
Numerous officers accepted the ugly reality that Indians had to be defeated if the United 
States was to develop. Appreciating what was needed did not mean they always approved of 
the policies they were asked to carry out. Yet, in a counterintuitive twist, their empathy may 
have eased their consciences regarding the use of overwhelming force. Because Carson, 
for instance, knew it would take ruthlessness to get the Navajo to surrender, he dragged his 
feet. It also may help explain why he so willingly turned to the Utes. 
Carson's use of Utes (and Apaches) when fighting the Navajos reveals a lot. First, if 
one of the country's most adept mountain men needed Indian assistance to subdue Indians 
in harsh terrain, who did not. Second, the fact that their traditional enemies were on the 
loose in Canyon de Chelly proved instrumental in the Navajos's willingness to come to 
terms.34 But third, while Carson's use of Utcs impelled the Navajo to surrender, they still 
would only surrender to him, in person. This signals that, in their view, Carson himself 
hardly fought them like a Ute. 
Worth noting is that very few, if any, Western armies in the Americas succeeding 
against Indians without making use of other Indians. The fact that local enmities pre-dated 
the arrival of Europeans made it relatively easy for outsiders to recruit local auxiliaries 
and scouts.35 Typically, using Indians to fight Indians offered four advantages. First, local 
knowledge proved indispensable for tracking down war parties and locating hideouts. 
Second, using Indians versus Indians kept tribes from uniting. This, in fact, is one reason 
James Carleton, Carson's commander, encouraged him to use Jicarilla Apaches and Utes 
against the Navajo; Carleton wanted to ensure that the Rocky Mountain and Plains tribes 
did not join forces in an anti-U.S. coalition.36 
The third edge Indian allies offered was psychological. As John Bourke noted about 
subduing the Apache, "They had never been afraid of the Americans alone, but now that 
their own people were fighting against them they did not know what to do."37 Crazy Horse 
and his followers likewise "yielded because they saw that it was impossible to stand against 
the coalition made by General Crook between the white soldiers and their own people."38 
Basically, once Whites and Indians showed up in places where fugitive groups felt safest 
and most hidden, they knew their days of freedom were numbered. 
As for the fourth advantage auxiliaries and scouts provided: the cavalry could stay 
cavalry. Soldiers did not have to fight like Indians. Although it has become commonplace 
to assert that the most successful Indian fighters fought Indians using Indian methods, 
this is not true. Yes, cavalry units rode further and harder once they learned to lighten 
their loads. But they never lived off the land, let alone off of buffalo (like, say, the Plains 
tribes), let alone off the land and via raiding like the Apaches or Comanches. In the most 
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profound ways, Western Indian fighters instead stayed quite Western. Certainly those who 
were successful did learn to negotiate with Indians to Indians' satisfaction. But-and this 
is the critical point-Indians no more mistook Whites for Indians when it came to peace 
talks than they did in battle. This, too, underscores the takeaway that Whites never really 
adopted Indian approaches to warfare. To suggest they did distorts history. 
Equally significantly, Crook-the exemplar-never tried to turn his Indian auxiliaries 
into something other than Indians: "General Crook makes of his Indian auxiliaries, not sol-
diers, but more formidable Indians."39 This, too, helped ensure soldiers remained soldiers. 
In other words, just because the U.S. Army found itself waging wars against Indians did 
not mean the U.S. army transformed itself into some hybrid new thing.40 
As for those who were the real experts at Indian fighting-namely, other Indians-
auxiliaries and scouts usually fought in multiple campaigns. Witness the Delaware. 
Delaware mercenaries were employed for generations, and from one side of the coun-
try to the other. Or take the Pawnee. Between 1864 and 1877, Pawnee 
scouts rendered invaluable assistance to the United States Army .... The Pawnee 
scouts led missions deep into contested territory, tracked resisting bands and 
spearheaded attacks into their villages, protected construction crews of the 
Union Pacific Railroad against Indian raiders, carried dispatches through dan-
gerous territory, and, on more than one occasion, saved American troops from 
disaster on the field of battle.41 
This is another under-recognized aspect of the Indian Wars. While Crook et al. continue to 
receive the lion's share of the credit for coming up with new ways to fight Indians, worth 
considering is just which of their innovations should really be considered most significant 
or valuable. 
Arguably, the most important thing any successful Indian fighter did was prove able to 
read Indian people(s), both as friends and foes-and to respond to them accordingly. 
A Few More Comparisons 
By now it should be clear: the common counterinsurgency trope that "American ground 
troops had better learn to be more like the natives" may be wrong-headed. As for what else a 
reappraisal of American Indian history suggests, one can find a range of other illuminating 
parallels and counterpoints. 
Take, for instance, the bane of most commanders' recent existence: competing agendas 
across different branches of the U.S. military and throughout the interagency. At the height 
of the Indian Wars ( 1846-1890), the problem of stove pipes, rice bowls, and split jurisdic-
tions with both the Indian Bureau and the War Department responsible for Indian affairs 
created endless difficulties. Compounding them were Congressional rivalries played out in 
personnel appointments in these very same departments. Not only were Indian agents-the 
contractors of their day (?!)-notoriously corrupt, but they tended to have short tenures 
and thus came to understand little and could have cared less about their charges. Or, as the 
Apaches were wont to complain to John Bourke: the lack of "continuous relations" with 
their agents led to chronic inconsistency. 
As for the media, not only was the nineteenth-century press prone to inaccurate re-
porting, but it could sensationalize and whip up public sentiment unusually effectively, 
not all of which was always anti-Indian. For instance, the media could and did turn atroc-
ities committed against Indians into national causes that then prompted Congressional 
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investigations. For their part, humanitarians instigated all manner of pro- and anti-
assimilation campaigns. To say do-gooders often competed with one another (as they 
do today), or that they seized on any connection or opportunity to lobby politicians, barely 
does the situation in the late 1800s justice. Indeed, today's development efforts hardly look 
novel compared to much that was tried out on Indians. 
Of course, at least some of what Indians were subjected is no longer possible. Crook, 
for example, was a fierce proponent of workfare. He felt that putting Indians to work 
would keep them from brooding over the wrongs they had suffered, while hard physical 
labor would likewise prevent their reacting to boredom via violence.42 Thus, as soon as the 
Apaches surrendered he put them to work digging irrigation ditches and tilling fields. For 
better or worse, this program did not last, while Crook's other idea of enlisting Indians in 
the military never got off the ground. 
From Crook's perspective, Apaches lived in a tribal society; Caucasians belonged to an 
individualized civilization. He recognized that his Apache scouts had enlisted as individuals. 
Over time he felt sure that 1heir military service would help them to individuate.43 Nor was 
Crook alone in this conviction. Other generals, like Sherman, agreed with him.44 How ironic, 
then, that American Indians have not only been among the U.S.'s staunchest patriots, serving 
in the military in disproportionale numbers, but !hat after more than 100 years, tribes still 
have not dissolved. No doubt tribes' privileged status as quasi-sovereign entities has helped 
prevent their dissolution. But no less important has been all the programmatic churn and 
serial experimentalion by the federal government. Indeed, combine the federal government's 
lack of a coherent and consistent policy with the fact that enough Indians have lived remotely 
for long enough, and we have one plausible explanation for why tribes continue to persist. 
However, the overriding reason for tribes, and not just Indians, persisting might lie 
deeper still. After all, not even Kit Carson, who had two Indian wives, seemed to fully 
appreciate the depth of Indians' attachment and thus their commitment to their sense of 
"peoplehood," and the difference this has always made. 
Conclusions 
There are books' worth of other striking parallels one can find between our experiences with 
tribes in this country and with non-Westerners abroad. But similarities represent only one 
side of the coin. Differences are no less revealing. For instance, opponents today possess 
organizational capabilities and technologies, geopolitical reach, and numbers of potential 
sympathizers that American Indian leaders could never have dreamed of. We would be 
fools many times over to fight Al Qaeda's future progeny as though they are tribesmen 
from our past. 
At the same time, we need 10 remember: we got Indians to submit by destroying or, at 
the very least, curtailing their way of life. There is no nice way to put this. We successfully 
turned Indians from independenl inlo domeslic-dependent peoples. Doing so took decades. 
And we had two distinct advantages. First, Indians did not stand a demographic chance. 
We vastly outnumbered them.45 Second, they depended on resources, like buffalo or deer, 
on which we did not. In conlrast, our current (or any likely future) adversaries do not 
have a unique way of life we can successfully single out for destruction. If anything, the 
opposite is the case, since it is our presence, our global clout, our profligate ways, and our 
values (which themselves require that we promote all of the above) that creale friction, 
lead to grievances, and help put us in others' crosshairs. Among other things, it is our 
methods of engagement with them that people resent. Yet, to the extent that our aggressive 
commercialism is part and parcel of who we are, redressing ourselves as a grievance may 
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not be possible-at least not without a radical reappraisal of how we do business. Yet, how 
do we do that if doing so defies who we are? 
This is one conundrum we face. A second challenge inheres in how we sort through 
learnable lessons from the past decade at war. And here is where much care will be needed 
since, from certain angles, our tribal encounters in Afghanistan and Iraq do bear an uncanny 
resemblance to tribal encounters from our past-highlighting these has been one purpose 
of this review article. But what about the Hip side of those encounters? What about what 
these encounters reveal about us. For instance, what if tribal non-Westerners are less like 
our Indians than it is we who remain too much our Westernizing selves? 
Whose similarities would we do better to focus on then? This is a question that points 
to one of the perennial problems with analogies. They tend to focus us on only certain 
sets of comparisons, deflecting us from inconvenient other truths. This harkens back to the 
lumper/splitter problem alluded to at the outset of the article: should every armed movement 
be labeled an insurgency? The failsafe answer to such a question has to be "no," since 
differences always matter, and differences are what make every case unique. Consequently, 
cases drawn from American Indian or any history should only ever be used as foils, since 
foils-unlike analogies-help throw both differences and similarities into high relief. 
In that spirit, then, and as a thought exercise, imagine where we might be today if only 
we had remained more familiar with our country's long history with American Indians 
prior to 9/11. Presumably, a more appreciative re-consideration of our non-Westerners 
might have helped us realize why we would engender resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Just as a re-examination of relations with the living, breathing non-Westerners we should 
know best-American Indians-might have better prepared us for the difficulties we would 
experience understanding non-Westerners we did not really know at all. Alternatively, had 
we been able to acknowledge how little we still appreciate about the non-Westerners in 
our midst we might have more honestly self-assessed. That alone could have been eye-
openingly useful-especially since, in hindsight, we ended up once again ignoring Sun 
Tzu's commonsense dictum of understanding our adversaries and ourselves-something 
that, more than 100 years ago, men like Crook and Carson instinctively knew to do. 
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